Abstract: Digital watermarking technology plays an important role in the areas of copyright protection and identity tracing for owners of digital mediums. At present, the security of the watermarking scheme is facing a great threat. However, the existing Zero knowledge-based watermark detection scheme (ZKWD) are still facing some challenging problems, such as ambiguity attacks. In this paper, a public ZKWD protocol is proposed for plain text, and the homomorphic property of asymmetric encryption algorithm in the multiplication operation is used to prevent the owner from cheating by ambiguity attacks. Compared with existing methods, the security of our proposed ZKWD scheme is improved by using the improved feature extraction algorithm.
Introduction
Text is the most widely used digital medium on the Internet, which brings people great convenience. But on the other hand, many problems are caused, such as copyright disputes and unauthorized copying etc. Digital watermarking has been recognized as one of most helpful technologies to protect the copyright of digital medium. At present, most of watermarking methods hold same secret key when embedding or detecting the watermarking information. This watermarking paradigm is called "symmetric" watermarking scheme. However, the secret key in symmetric watermarking scheme may leak when detecting watermarking information because of the untrusted prover. The disclosure of the secret key can efficiently assist watermark-estimation attack [1] in removing watermarks. One solution to this problem is that we can use a secret key for watermarking embedding and a different but public key for watermarking detection. This is known as "asymmetric" watermarking scheme. Hartung and Girod [2] firstly proposed the idea of "asymmetric" watermarking. However, the current asymmetric watermarking schemes only achieve limited robustness, and may suffer from security threat.
In view of this security leakage, zero knowledge watermark detection (ZKWD) [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] scheme has been introduced by some researchers without obviously revealing the secret information, which can solve the problem of security effectively. The fundamental principle behind the zero knowledge watermark detection scheme is that a prover could convince a verifier that the prover certainly owns a secret key without revealing any watermarking-related information to verifier [8] .
At present, the existing ZKWD schemes still suffer from some challenging problems, such as ambiguity attacks [9] [10] [11] etc. One well known example for ambiguity attacks is that an adversary can create an ambiguous situation by deriving a forged watermark from a public work, and commits the forged watermarking information. Furthermore, the adversary is able to derive a watermark from existing non-watermarked medium in the public domain and claim ownership of them later.
In this paper, we propose a public zero knowledge watermark detection scheme which can prevent the owner from cheating by ambiguity attacks for plain text. Watermarking information is generated by using logistic chaotic mapping function from the extracted robust text features. Then the generated watermarking information is embedded into the text by using our proposed natural language information hiding method. Verifier can believe that the text in question indeed contains the owner's watermark during the watermark detection process through calculating the correlation between the watermark and the original text whose value is greater than a certain threshold.
Zero Knowledge Proof
A zero knowledge proof of knowledge [13-14] is a two-party protocol between a prover and a verifier, which allows the prover to convince the verier that he/she knows some secret information (proof of knowledge property), without that the verifier learns anything about them (zero knowledge property).
Zero Knowledge Cave [14] is a well-known example used to describe the main idea of zero knowledge proof. There are two parties in a zero knowledge proof protocol. The first party is known as a prover (Peggy) to prove the statement, while the second party is known as a verifier (Victor) to verify the statement.
In this story, the circle cave has one entrance and a magic door which is placed inside the cave. The scenario depicted a proof protocol between Peggy and Victor, which help Peggy to prove her knowing the secret word which will open the magic door without revealing the secret word (which can open the door) to Victor. As shown by Figure 1 the cave paths are labeled as A for the left path and B for the right path. Both Victor and Peggy start from the cave entrance, X. First, Peggy enters the cave and randomly takes either path A or B while Victor must wait outside. Then, Victor will enter the cave to point Y and tell Peggy to appear from either path A or path B (randomly). Therefore, Peggy now can prove that she really knows the secret word by opening the magic door, if necessary and returns back to Y thru the path requested by Victor. For example, assume that Peggy knows the secret word and already she has gone inside the cave by path A and Victor ask her (randomly) to return back by path B, then she can open the magic door to appear on path A as requested by Victor. Assume Peggy does not know the secret word then this selection gives Peggy 50% chance of choosing properly. Repeating this protocol many times successfully makes Victor convinced that Peggy does actually know the secret word if Peggy can correctly appear all the time from the requested path specified by Victor.
Zero knowledge watermark detection
The zero knowledge watermark detection scheme proposed in this paper consists of text robust feature extraction, watermarks generation, watermarking embedding and watermark detection. The basic idea of our proposed public ZKWD scheme is as follows:
Firstly, watermarks are generated by using logistic chaotic map from the robust text features which are extracted from plain text using our proposed feature extraction algorithm; then the watermarks are embedded into the plain text using our proposed natural language information hiding method (substitution of synonyms based on the semantic adjacent words). Therefore, there is a great correlation between the secret sequence (watermark) and the original text. When the zero knowledge watermark detection protocol is applied, verifier believes that the text in question contains the watermark claimed by prover by calculating the correlation, if the correlation value is greater than a certain threshold. The implementation process of the proposed method is illustrated in Figure 2 .
Robust Feature Extraction
In this section, a robust feature extraction method based on improved TF•IDF (term frequency • inverse document frequency) method is proposed to extract the robust features, which will be used to generate the watermarks combining with the author information, from the plain text. The aim of this method is to produce a great correlation between the embedded watermarks and the plain text. This can efficiently assist zero knowledge watermarking detection.
Firstly, a large corpus which contains many categories is created. The text in question could be considered as a sample in the corpus. Then the weights of terms in the text are calculated by using our improved TF•IDF method. Lastly, the terms whose weights are greater than a certain threshold are selected as the robust features. The specific description of our improved TF•IDF method is as follows. TF•IDF is the one of the most effective ways to calculate term weight. TF•IDF equals TF multiplies by IDF, in which TF is short for term frequency that is used to calculate the describing ability of the term; and IDF is short for inverse document frequency which is used to calculate the distinguishing ability of the term.
Where N is the text total of all categories, n is the number of the texts which include term t. The main idea of IDF is that the smaller n is, the larger the IDF is, and term t will have a better category distinguishing ability. TF•IDF is based on the Advanced Science and Technology Letters Vol.48 (CIA 2014) assumption that the word which can distinguish the texts should be the one that appears frequently in the text but reversely in other texts.
However, TF•IDF has some problems. The range of TF defined by TF•IDF is too wide and neglects the frequency in the texts of a certain category. That is to say, the structure of TF multiplies by IDF can't reflect the distribution of terms in a certain category and then can't reflect the importance degree and difference between categories.
We add a weight to the original TF•IDF. The added weight considers the frequency of the term, which is in a particular category in the whole text collection, rather than simply consider the frequency of the term which is in the other documents of the whole text collection.
Suppose N is the total number of texts, n is the number of the texts containing term t, p and q is the maximum and second maximum number of texts containing term t in a certain category respectively. Therefore, to improve the distinguishing ability between categories, i.e. the category to which the text containing term t belongs and other categories, we introduce a new weight
Then the formula is modified as:
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Where (p-q) is the D-value between the maximum and second maximum number of texts containing term t in a certain category. When the number of the texts in a category containing term t is large, the number of the texts in the other categories containing term t is small. Then the term can represent the feature of the category of the texts containing the largest number of term t, so the weighting value is large, i.e. the feature representation ability of term t is inversely proportional to the number of the texts in all categories except the category containing the largest number of term t. Because term t may be exclusively included by a single category, i.e. p may be equals q, the numerator should be (p-q+1). Experiments demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed method.
Watermarking Generation Method
In this section, a watermarking generation method based on logistic chaotic map is proposed. Chaotic systems have many important properties, such as the sensitive dependence on initial conditions and system parameters, the density of the set of all periodic points and topological transitivity, etc. Most properties are related to some requirements such as mixing and diffusion in the sense of cryptography. Therefore, chaotic cryptosystems have more useful and practical applications.
The watermark information is generated from the extracted robust features and author information. The specific watermarking generation method is described as follows:
Advanced Science and Technology Letters Vol.48 (CIA 2014) Input: the extracted robust features F, the author information A Output: the watermarks W 1) Get the digital representation of the extracted robust feature using ASCII encoding and add it to F; 2) Get the digital representation of the author information using ASCII encoding and add it to F;
3) Scramble the sequence F using logistic chaotic map to S and keep the initial conditions and system parameters secret; 4) Get binarization sequence W (the watermarks) of the sequence S by defining the threshold;
According to the unidirectionality of chaotic sequence, it is very difficult for attackers to deduce the initial conditions and system parameters, because they are confidential and only the copyright holder owns them. Therefore the watermark generation function is a one-way function.
Watermarking Embedding Method
While zero knowledge watermark detection protocol is an important step towards secure watermark detection, it can only function reasonably if an embedded watermark can be detected/extracted from attacked media data. As a result, robustness against attacks is believed to be the prerequisite that must be satisfied before zero knowledge watermark detection protocol can be applied. In this section, we use the common natural language watermarking method for text watermarking [15].
Public Zero Knowledge Watermark Detection Protocol
A cheating prover can intentionally choose a "faked" watermark as though it were the legal watermark to pass the verification of the protocol and deceive the verifier. Another case, the trusted third party is required in some zero knowledge watermark detection protocols to verify the signatures of the prover and verifier. However, the protocol could also be attacked by untrusted third party, and the involvement of trusted third party increases communication complexity. Therefore, in this section, a zero knowledge watermark detection protocol is proposed to prevent the owner from cheating by dishonesty prover and untrusted third party in the process of zero knowledge watermark detection.
According to the homomorphic property of asymmetric encryption algorithm in the multiplication operation and the public parameters of the hash function, anyone who can be considered as a verifier can detect that whether the data sent by prover is correct or not. By calculating the linear correlation, verifier can believe that the text in question contains the watermark claimed by prover when the value of the correlation is greater than a certain threshold.
Our proposed protocol is described as follows 2) Constructs zero watermarks using our proposed watermarks generation method based on logistic chaotic map;
3) Embed the watermarks into the plain text by using our proposed natural language information hiding method that is substitution of synonyms based on the semantic adjacent words; 4) Execute the following protocol a) the Prover generates a random R, calculates H(R, W) and H(R, L w ) using asymmetric encryption algorithm H, and sends H(R, d) The prover and the verifier operate the protocol n times to achieve the desired confidence. If the verification is proved correctly each time, the verifier believes that the text in question contains the watermark the prover claimed. Otherwise, if having any failure, the verifier does not believe the prover's statement and considers that the prover is cheating. A cheating prover could, at best, succeed at cheating with probability 1/2. If the protocol is repeated n time, the cheating prover could succeed at cheating with probability 1/2 n . Again, this algorithm is performed until the probability of cheating falls beneath a certain threshold.
Conclusion
In this paper, a public zero knowledge watermark detection protocol is proposed to prevent the owner from cheating by ambiguity attacks. Four steps are concluded in our proposed zero knowledge watermark detection scheme to achieve this goal: robust
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Vol.48 (CIA 2014) feature extraction method, watermarks generation method, watermarking embedding method and zero knowledge watermark detection protocol. Any verifier can check that whether the medium contains a watermark claimed by prover or not. The proposed method can satisfy the three requirements of zero knowledge proof of identity: completeness, soundness, zero knowledge. Meantime, the method ensures the security for watermark verification in the watermarking detection process without revealing any secret information related to watermarking. 
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